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proceedings were unique due to the bifurcated proceedings before,
first, a referee and second, after re-referral, to a discovery and trial
before the water court. However, the court concluded that in the
absence of a statute that states otherwise, trial courts have discretion in
awarding costs to the prevailing party. The concept of prevailing party
is consistent with Rule 54(d), because by the time a water case reaches
the second phase in a trial before the water court, it becomes litigation
where the prevailing party is entitled to costs. The court ruled that
they would not generally overturn an award of costs on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Here, the court found no abuse of discretion,
as the water court's decision was supported by the record. Thus, the
court affirmed the water court's order awarding costs to GASP.
Stacy Hochman

Moyer v. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n, 78 P.3d 313 (Colo. 2003)
(holding that water court did not violate its discretion in rejecting
Moyers' Bill of Costs filed more than twenty months late).
In the fall of 1996, Appellee Empire Lodge Homeowners'
Association ("Empire Lodge") filed a complaint in the District Court
for Water Division No. 2. Empire Lodge alleged enlargement of the
Moyers' use of a decreed irrigation right. Moyer counterclaimed that
Empire Lodge diverted water out-of-priority. In March 2003, the
water court dismissed Empire Lodge's suit and issued an injunction in
favor of Moyer's counterclaim. Additionally, the water court ordered
costs in favor of Moyer and instructed Moyer to file a Bill of Costs. On
April 6, 2000, Moyer filed a motion requesting an extension of time,
specifically until April 28, to submit the Bill of Costs. The water court
granted the motion.
On April 25, Moyer again moved for an
extension of time until June 15, 2000, or three weeks after the court
had ruled on pending motions for reconsideration filed by Empire
Lodge and a motion to intervene from a state engineer, whichever was
later. On May 2, 2000, the water court denied those motions. On
February 25, 2002, Moyer submitted her Bill of Costs, and Empire
Lodge objected. The water court denied the Bill of Costs. Moyer
appealed the water court's denial of the Bill of Costs and the
subsequent motiofi for reconsideration directly to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
The court addressed whether the water court had abused its
discretion in rejecting Moyer's Bill of Costs. The court stated that the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure ("CRCP") applied to water court
proceedings, except where the rules expressly state otherwise. CRCP
121 requires a party to submit a Bill of Costs either 15 days after a
judgment, or at a later time that the court permits. In the first motion,
Moyer requested a later date, which the water court granted. The
water court, however, never ruled on the second motion. Although
the water court could have granted another extension, it did not.
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Moyer argued that the water court should have granted this motion
because of Empire Lodge's failure to submit a timely objection. The
court held that Empire Lodge's failure to object did not deprive the
water court of its power to deny the motion for extension. Moyer also
contended that the filing of the motion tolled the expiration deadline
of the previous motion. The court disagreed, stating that the failure to
address the motion did not extend the expired deadline. With respect
to the subsequent motion to reconsider, Moyer argued that because
the water court did not rule on her second motion to extend, her
missed deadline was due to excusable neglect. The court disagreed
and held that her actions were not based on an erroneous court order
and that her circumstances were different than circumstances of
excusable neglect. The court stated that failing to meet a deadline
because she decided to wait to hear the ruling of a request to extend
the deadline was not the same as relying on an erroneous court order.
Thus, the court affirmed the water court's decision.
Robert E. Wells

CONNECTICUT
Prestige Builders, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Comn'n of Ansonia, 831
A.2d 290 (Conn. App. 2003) (holding that an inland wetlands
commission must enact a formal regulation granting it authority over
upland review areas before it can regulate those areas.)
In 2000, in the Superior Court of Connecticut at Ansonia, Prestige
Builders sought review of the inland wetlands commission's denial of
its application to construct a nine lot residential subdivision. The
complaint addressed two issues: (1) whether current statutes provided
the Inland Wetlands Commission of the City of Ansonia
("Commission") authority to regulate activities in upland review areas
without first enacting a regulation governing activities in such areas,
and (2) whether common law provided the Commission with such
authority. The superior court dismissed the complaint and Prestige
Builders appealed to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. On appeal,
the court found in favor of Prestige Builders and remanded the case,
directing the commission to grant the construction application.
Prestige Builders owned property within the City of Ansonia.
Several areas of wetlands and watercourses totaling one acre existed on
the property.
In 2000, Prestige Builders proposed a nine lot
residential subdivision on approximately 7.5 acres of the property.
The Commission determined that because the property contained
wetlands and watercourses, any activity in and around those areas
constituted regulated activity, as defined by the Commission's
regulations. Therefore, the Commission indicated it had authority to
analyze the environmental impacts of the proposed construction.

